Suffering We Would Choose
(So God Would Choose for Us)

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It seems bad for us to suffer, and many philosophers wonder why God would allow suffering at all. In this paper, I argue that although we don't want to suffer at the time of suffering, there's much suffering we would choose to undergo were we to take a more holistic view of our lives—a view as if we were at or after our life's end with full information about our life as a whole and the value of suffering. I then use that conclusion to address a premise in the Argument from Suffering against God's existence: God isn't justified in allowing us to suffer. I argue that, for much of our suffering, God is justified in allowing us to suffer precisely because God is wisely choosing for us what we would choose for ourselves. God, by allowing us to suffer, is thereby acting as our proxy.

In this paper, I argue for two claims about suffering. The first is that there's much suffering that we would choose to undergo were we to take a holistic view of our lives. This holistic view is a view of our lives as if we were at or after our life's end with full information about both our life as a whole and the value of suffering. As I'll argue, all of this is true even if (and especially if) we don't want to suffer at or around the time of suffering. The second claim is a defense against a premise in the Argument from Suffering against God's existence. According to that premise, God isn't justified in allowing us to suffer.[1] In response, I argue that for much of our suffering, God is justified in allowing us to suffer because God has an omniscient, holistic perspective on our lives and wisely chooses suffering we would choose for ourselves if we were to have that perspective. God, by allowing us to suffer, is thereby acting as our proxy.[2]

'Suffering', as it's used throughout this paper, refers to a kind of psychological pain or disturbance that accompanies a state of affairs that one wishes not to obtain.[3] Suffering is only

[1] To fill out the rest of the argument: if God exists, God is all-good and so wouldn't allow what God isn't justified in allowing. So, God doesn't exist.

[2] I use 'proxy' to refer to any substitute decision maker for the someone. In U.S. health care contexts, 'proxy' and 'surrogate' both refer to a substitute decision maker for a patient, but they are differentiated in that surrogates are not chosen and proxies are. I don't make that differentiation here.

[3] I here follow Hick (1978)'s use of 'suffering': "[T]he opposite of the psychic state of pleasure is the psychic state that is variously called unpleasure, suffering, discomfort, distress, anguish, negative hedonic tone, and which I propose to

one kind of evil among many.[4] It's distinct from evils such as languishing, morally impermissible acts, vice, or the mere thwarting one's desires. Further, although suffering involves pain, pain itself does not require suffering. An athlete, for example, could play through physical pain while ignoring or even enjoying the additional challenge of playing while in pain. Suffering, then, is just one kind of pain. As I use 'suffering', one could lose a good friend but not suffer, or, alternatively, one could lose a good friend and suffer, e.g., by grieving.

It might be that some people would be content to live in a world like ours but without suffering, thus with no psychological pain or disturbances. This would be a world in which lives might be more or less short, bodies might be more or less impaired, efforts might be more or less efficacious, and thought be more or less perspicacious, but no one is disturbed by such things. To those who find such a world acceptable, the problem of suffering (as I am using 'suffering') is particularly acute; since the world just described is acceptable, it's the psychological pain or disturbance that makes our actual lives so unbearable.

Throughout this paper, I assume that that there are goods besides pleasure and evils besides pain. I also assume that the goods and evils that there are cannot be commensurated by assigning units of pleasure/pain to each and performing a utilitarian calculus.[5] The reason behind these assumptions is that there are some lives that include more pain (through suffering) than pleasure, and my argument involves the claim that we would sometimes choose such a life for the sake of other goods. We would not choose these goods if they were commensurable with other goods and evils by means of a pleasure/pain calculus.

In what follows, in Section 1, I argue that there's much suffering that we would choose were we to have a holistic view of our lives. In Section 2, I provide a defense of God's allowance of much of the suffering in our life: God rightfully chooses for us what we would choose for ourselves were we to have a holistic view of our life.

1. Suffering We Would Choose

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call suffering." (292) Note that the state of affairs about which one suffers need not be bad. One can suffer due to a wayward or inapt desire. This use of 'suffering' is distinct from the use of that term by Eleonore Stump, who writes that suffering occurs when someone "is kept from being what he ought to be, or when he is kept from having the desires of his heart, or both." (2018, 14) Although it's valuable to address suffering in Stump's sense, one could suffer in Stump's sense but not be psychologically pained or disturbed, so not suffer in my sense.[3] For example, a Stoic sage might be cut open by the enemy's sword while maintaining a tranquil mind. According to Stump, that Stoic sage suffers because he's languishing, but according to my usage the Stoic sage doesn't suffer, since the sage doesn't experience any psychological pain or disturbance. It is suffering in my sense that I argue we would choose and that God is justified in allowing.

[4] Thus, to explain why suffering occurs is not to explain why evil in general occurs. A defense against the Problem of Suffering is thus not necessarily a defense against the Problem of Evil.

[5] This assumption is compatible with the view that some states of affairs are clearly preferable to others. This preference ordering, however, is not the result of commensurating those goods via a utilitarian calculus.

Even though we often don't want to suffer when we're suffering, and even though we often would choose not to undergo suffering at the time of suffering, for much of that suffering, when we reflect later in life, we wouldn't wish it away. In fact, looking back on our suffering with a holistic view of our lives, we might even be nostalgic about the fact that we'd suffered in the way we did. In conversations in which people have reflected on their lives, these kinds of phrases are commonplace:

> "I suffered a lot at that time of life, but I wouldn't take any of it back."
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> "It was really rough for me personally, but I wouldn't have wanted it any other way."
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> "I hated it at the time, but ultimately I'm grateful it happened."[6]

Why wouldn't we take our suffering back? Why wouldn't we have wanted the situation without the suffering? Why would we be grateful for having suffered? Ostensibly, it's because the person making the statement thinks the suffering was a valuable part of his or her life. It's a fact of life that we often want not to do things now that are, in fact, valuable for us, and sometimes we don't realize this until later. This realization is the basis for the advice to think about one's life from the perspective of its end in order to get oneself to do difficult but valuable things now.[7]

There are also some kinds of suffering that we choose to undergo now even though we could prevent our suffering. For some examples, we choose to grieve the death of our loved ones even though we could, instead, soldier on and get work done. We choose to reflect on our past wrongdoings and feel guilt for having done them even though we could ignore them, and we choose to worry about whether our loved ones will recover from their illness even though we could redirect our focus on the present.[8] Of course, it's bad to have our loves ones' lives cut short, to have made poor choices, and to be sick, but given that these things have occurred, we might still choose to suffer through grief, remorse, or worry.

Of course, when we suffer, we want not to suffer.[9] If it doesn't feel bad psychologically, it's not really suffering. If someone relishes in one's state, it doesn't seem much like suffering. For example, someone who's in a state she would describe as "guilt" for a wrongdoing while

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[6] The examples are present throughout published work, too. For some examples, in *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov says that his suffering, which he once cursed, is a fire his soul needs. (Dostoevsky 1866/2002, 6.7) Rainer Maria Rilke says that sometimes the sadness, misery, and depression in our lives are dragons that should not be shut out of our lives; they really just want love and beauty from us. (Rilke 1929/1993, Letter 8) Cheryl Strayed says she wouldn't take back her feeling of being abandoned, unloved, unloved, and forgotten; it felt like her path. (Strayed 2012, ch. 17) Viktor Frankl says that "without suffering…human life cannot be complete." (Frankl 1946/2006, 113)

[7] See, for example Epicurus (125/2009, ch. 21), Seneca (49/2005), and, for a contemporary example, Brooks (2015).

[8] These instances of suffering all involve emotions that Stoics advise against having. I assume here that these emotions are worth having even though they are instances of suffering.

[9] This is true even if we simultaneously want to suffer. We might want not to suffer while simultaneously wanting: to suffer while wanting not to suffer. The result is a conflict of desires that some people intentionally will. For example, some people deliberately subject themselves to extreme cold in order to suffer through it. They want not to suffer the cold at the time of exposure, and they desire to escape the discomfort, but simultaneously they want themselves to: suffer, desire escape, and remain in the suffering state.

simultaneously enjoying how she feels would not thereby be suffering (and, we might think, not really be experiencing guilt). So, we need to want not to suffer in order to actually suffer.[10]

Nevertheless, we might choose to suffer. In these cases, we recognize the value of suffering, make the choice to suffer (or to allow ourselves to suffer), but, when the choice is made, desire not to be in the position our choice has put us in. Further, in these cases, if we have a strong enough desire to be in the position we've chosen to put ourselves in, we thereby no longer suffer, and our choice to be in a suffering state has thus become inefficacious.

Why would people choose to put themselves in a position they know they'll want not to be in? Why would someone choose to suffer? Below I outline six reasons. These reasons are meant to articulate the value of suffering, or its good-making features, which might make it choiceworthy were one to take a holistic view of one's life. These reasons are not exhaustive, but they do, I believe, cover much of our suffering. To preview these reasons, suffering is choiceworthy when it:

1) is for a purpose or a cause,
2) is the fitting response to, or result of, our situation,
3) is essential for self-improvement,
4) directs us to rely on, and develop union with, God,
5) makes us into the people we are, or
6) calls out to others to empathize with our plight.

Suffering for a Purpose or Cause

We might choose to suffer for the sake of a purpose or cause. Athletes often choose to suffer to play their sport.[11] After all, they could choose to stop competing. Of course, some athletes might choose to compete, knowing that suffering results, and so choose the suffering indirectly. However, many athletes choose the suffering directly. Suffering filters out devotion and excellence, and it makes the result even more triumphant.[12]

Relationships such as marriage, parenting, and close friendships, too, inevitably involve suffering of some sort. These relationships require adapting to another person in sometimes emotionally

[10] Concerning the case of cold exposure in the previous note: someone can have conflicting desires about suffering, but if someone's desire to suffer in the extreme cold is sufficiently high, insofar as one has that desire, one is thereby not suffering but is merely pained. By repeated cold exposure accompanied by increased desire to be in that state, one is thereby turning one's suffering into mere pain, perhaps building up one's immunity to suffering given the cold conditions.

[11] For example, Courtney Dauwalter, an ultramarathoner, chooses to enter what she calls her "pain cave" when running. (Guiberteau 2024)

[12] Sabrina Little argues against the common mentality that "pain is just weakness leaving the body," and "no pain, no gain," noting that suffering in competition does make the result more meaningful and triumphant. (Little 2024, chs. 7-8)

painful ways and persevering through emotional hurt wrought by interpersonal slights. When parents, for example, look back on their suffering, they see their suffering as worth it.[13]

We often don't choose the occasion for our suffering, but given that we suffer, the mere presence of a purpose or cause makes the suffering valuable. Victor Frankl, a holocaust survivor, states that *any* meaning makes suffering endurable for the sake of that meaning (Frankl 1946/2006). Of course, Frankl would not choose to have been forced into a concentration camp, but what made his suffering valuable, given those circumstances, is that he endured suffering to reunite with his wife.

Similarly, some religious adherents count it as joy to endure suffering for God.[14] Martyrs endure torture and death, which they take to be indicative of their religious commitment, and martyrs are revered, presumably because they made a wise choice to suffer for God.[15]

Suffering as a Fitting Response or Result

Sometimes we choose to grieve as a response to a friend's death. Sometimes we feel guilt about a past wrongdoing. That's because we think we should do so, and it's good for us. If someone doesn't grieve the loss of his friend's death, we might think that indicates that he didn't really care for his friend. Similarly, if someone doesn't suffer guilt for her past wrongdoing, we might think that indicates a lack of coming to terms with the enormity of her choices. In these cases, people's suffering is good for them as a fitting response to their situation, and we think these responses would be fitting for us, too.[16]

There are other instances of fitting suffering. Just as we might think it's appropriate for someone to suffer guilt for past wrongdoing, we might think it's fitting for someone to have a stomachache for having eaten only junk food recently. The suffering fits the poor past choice. Similarly, it might be fitting for someone to suffer through physical pain upon one's sudden movement after remaining sedentary for many years.[17] In this case, too, suffering is the fitting result of past choices, this time constituting a lack of preparation.[18]

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[13] Paul Bloom, for example, notes that having kids results in lower reported life satisfaction and "a drop in marital satisfaction that doesn't usually recover until the children leave the house," but parents nevertheless cite their children as their greatest source of happiness. (Bloom 2021a, 2021b)

[14] For example, "Share in suffering like a good soldier of Christ Jesus" (2 Tim. 2:3), "Consider it pure joy whenever you face trials of any kind" (James 1:2), and "…Jesus also suffered outside the city gate…Let us then go to him outside the camp and bear the abuse he endured" (Heb. 13:12-13).

[15] One can find this by reading the reviews of *Foxe's Book of Martyrs.* (Foxe 1709/2023)

[16] Cholbi (2017) maintains that grief is a fitting response to a lost relationship, and Roberts (2007) writes that grief is "a construal of some great good as lost to oneself (or perhaps to those one loves). Strawson (2003) maintains that guilt is an attitude that fits having done something wrong.

[17] Little points this out respect to running with imprudent training in (Little 2024, 181).

[18] In fact, suffering itself might be the result of a lack of preparedness. There are philosophical and therapeutic techniques that one could practice now to alleviate one's future suffering. For example, one could read Stoics and attend religious services to situate one's own suffering in the context of virtue development and/or alignment with

Suffering as Essential for Self-Improvement

Sometimes our suffering contributes to our improvement, as emphasized in soul-making theodicies, and in these cases, we would choose the suffering because the suffering was essential for our improvement. For some examples, patience is developed by suffering through obstacles,[19] perseverance is developed by suffering through hardship,[20] temperance is developed through the difficulty of restraining oneself,[21] fortitude is developed by suffering through danger,[22] compassion is developed by suffering through another's hardship with that person,[23] and steadfast loyalty is developed by suffering through tensions in a relationship.[24]

Suffering that Directs Us to Union with God

As Stump (2010; 2018) argues, suffering is a call for one to rely on God.[25] Stump adopts Thomas Aquinas' theology, according to which union with God is the highest value, constitutive of one's flourishing. Suffering is valuable for the sufferer, even though the sufferer might not realize it at the time, because it leads the sufferer to make oneself open to God's help, or to surrender to God in love (2010, 396). Once the sufferer is open to God, union with God is established, and the sufferer's desires are realigned according to the sufferer's flourishing, which is just to be in union

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God. One could practice mindfulness, cognitive-behavioral therapy, logotherapy, and/or engagement in prayer. However, many of us tend not to think that people who don't prepare in this way suffer as a fitting result of their lack of preparedness. When we don't think this way, perhaps it's because we view ourselves as passive recipients of suffering states rather than directors of our own psychological states relevant to suffering. If we were to have the latter view, perhaps we would view some sufferers in much the same way as we view some people who suffer pain from sudden movement after years of remaining sedentary—a fitting result of a lack of preparedness.

[19] According to Aquinas, patience consists "in bearing things," to achieve goods "to which we had aspired by suffering." (*ST* II-II.136.2 ad 1) Pianalto (2016, 54) writes that patience is "the disposition to accept unavoidable burdens as well as those avoidable burdens that one can reasonably judge it to be wise to accept. Miller and Furr (2024) argue that patience is a stable disposition to react to slower than desired progress with a reasonable degree of calmness.

[20] According to Little, "Perseverance means to remain under a burden," (Little 2024; cf. *ST* II-II.137.1 sed contra) and John Hick (1978, 325) writes, "Determination and persistence would never be evoked in the absence of any challenges and obstacles."

[21] According to Aquinas, temperance "moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing)." (*ST* II-II.137.1 resp., and Aquinas says that "tribulations extinguish the force of concupiscent desires." (Aquinas 1969)

[22] According to Hick (1978, 325), "Courage would never be evoked in an environment devoid of all dangers." Aquinas writes that fortitude "is perfected in infirmity" (ST II-II.123.1 ad 1) and "moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which…is something difficult in itself)." (II-II.137.1 resp.)

[23] Hick (1978, 334) writes that "[M]en and women often act in true compassion and massive generosity and self-giving in the fact of unmerited suffering." According to Robert Roberts (2007, 180), compassion is "is a form of love based in the fellowship of suffering. … When I perceive someone compassionately, the weakness or suffering or dysfunction I see in him is a quality I also see in myself."

[24] Hick (1978, 325-6) writes that love "expresses itself most fully in mutual giving and helping and sharing in times of difficulty." According to Kleinig (2022), "Perseverance in human associations often requires individuals to make sacrifices for the good of the individual or group with whom the individual associates, sacrifices that self-interest naturally tempts us not to make." I've here called this perseverance in human associations that is expressed in love "steadfast loyalty".

[25] Hick (1978, ch. 15.3) also endorses this general explanation for suffering.

with God. Once the sufferer's desires are rightly aligned, the sufferer would choose to have suffered as a way of realigning his or her desires.[26]

Suffering as Identity-Making

Sometimes people's suffering isn't chosen for the sake of a cause, isn't the fitting response to or result of one's situation, and isn't used for self-improvement or union with God. Instead, sometimes people's suffering makes them into the kind of people they are. Their suffering is identity-making—it now constitutes their identity. For example, someone might be the person she is because she suffered as a refugee during a regime change, uprooted and now housed in a foreign place. To be clear, she might not have chosen the uprooting to occur. But given that that it did occur, as she reflects on the suffering itself, she might see that the suffering made her who she is—not necessarily self-improved, but just different than she could have been. Her suffering is now part of, or constitutive of, who she is.[27] Upon reflection later in life, given that she had to be a refugee, she might choose to have suffered in the way she did precisely because it made her the person she is now.[28]

Would someone really choose to have suffered in these ways? It seems like in many cases the answer is yes, even if that person wouldn't have chosen the event that occasioned the suffering.[29] Someone might have chosen to have suffered through being uprooted (given that she was uprooted), known that such suffering requires that one be uprooted, but not choose to have been uprooted. When one says, for example, "I suffered through being uprooted, and it was terrible, but I wouldn't have wanted it any other way," what that person likely means is: given that she was uprooted (which she would not have chosen), she would have chosen to have suffered through it, precisely because suffering through that event was identity-making for her.

Suffering as Empathy-Activating

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[26] More specifically, Christian *O Felix Culpa* theodicies have a similar result: suffering, like other evils, allow for redemption through Jesus's suffering, death, and resurrection, which unites us with Christ in atonement.

[27] Here I am referring not to numerical identity but to "narrative identity" in which my life can be seen as a whole, stretched out through history, and that history is constituted by events and experiences that explain my current traits and dispositions in a unified, coherent way. For a model of this, see Schechtman (1996).

[28] This choice is sometimes expressed in terms of gratitude, as it is in Anh Do's memoir (Do 2010).

[29] Choice isn't closed under known entailment. Subject S can choose X, know that X requires Y, but not choose Y, when Y is assumed or inevitable. For example, someone might know she will eventually die, know that every choice entails that she will eventually die (by true consequent), but not choose to eventually die. Similarly, if one assumes that she's uprooted as if it's an inevitability and partitions worlds accordingly, now only considering worlds in which she's uprooted, she might choose things in those worlds without having chosen for the uprooting assumption to be actual.

It's worth noting, however, that choice is closed under known *causal* entailment. For example, if S chooses X and S knows that X causally requires Y, then S thereby chooses Y. This is why we say that someone is choosing what she gives up when she makes known tradeoffs, which are causal entailments. For example, a parent could speak truly to his child by saying, "By choosing to sleep in this morning, you're choosing not to get your work done this morning," assuming the child knows about the tradeoff.

The suffering described in stories presented in literature on the Problem of Evil are salient in the minds of many philosophers of religion. These stories—for example, Rowe's fawn (1979, 337); mutilated children described by Ivan Karamazov (Dostoyevsky 1880/1993, 282-3), Russell (1989, 123), and van Inwagen (2006, 97); and a child who suffers through illness until death (e.g. Adams 1999, 25)—all involve a helpless victim who experiences extreme suffering and, in many cases, dies an untimely death.

Would these victims have chosen to suffer in these situations? To answer this question, we first need to distinguish clearly between what happens to someone and the suffering that the person undergoes. Even if someone's situation is objectively bad for the person and the person wouldn't have chosen it, given that it happened to the person, the person might have chosen to have suffered in that situation were the person able to make the choice at or after the end of her life.

Second, we should note that if there is a God, God might miraculously prevent suffering in cases in which the suffering isn't valuable for the first five reasons and in which the subject's suffering would be unknown by anyone else.[30] For example, if a child were to, until death, suffer without anyone else knowing whether the child suffers, perhaps God miraculously and compassionately prevents such suffering. A similar prevention might occur in a real version of Rowe's deer example, too. (Rowe's example is fictional, and the deer's suffering is postulated in the example.)

There are, however, many cases in which suffering isn't valuable for any of the five reasons above and the subject's suffering is known by others. Would sufferers choose to suffer in those cases? To figure out what's valuable about that kind of suffering, let's imagine what would happen if we knew that deer burned without suffering. Imagine if, when people were mutilated, they didn't suffer as a result. Imagine what would happen if we knew children didn't suffer from sickness, but just experienced biological symptoms and then died.

I imagine that if the world were this way, we wouldn't empathetically grieve with the victims. We might acknowledge that something bad has happened to them and grieve the event's occurrence. We might even do this next to the victim. But all of that is different from empathetically aligning with the victim to grieve *with* them. Sufferers themselves need to be acknowledged in their suffering. It's someone's suffering, more than anything, that calls out to us to empathetically

[30] There is, to my knowledge, no philosopher who has published this view in an academic work. However, Tom Morris expressed this position in response to a Facebook post by Keith DeRose: "I hold out a hope that even in fire and bombs and after the screams, there is a presence that we never or very rarely feel in ordinary life that calms and loves, embraces, welcomes, and transforms—and not just for us but our animal friends as well." (Morris 2024) DeRose cites another "wise correspondent" who writes, "[W]e just do not know what solace God may offer to those in very extreme circumstances of apparent suffering, or what comfort their presence might be capable of conferring." (DeRose 2024) This divine solace position seems to follow from the assumption that there is an all-good God and that unknown suffering, were it experienced, would not have value that would outweigh or defeat its badness.

grieve with victims about their own plight. Our emotions respond in empathy with sufferers precisely because they suffer, not only to acknowledge the badness of the sufferer's situation but also to align with the sufferer. This alignment creates a connection with the victim that merely participating in grieving activity about an event alongside the victim cannot itself achieve.

If our world were such that deer burned without suffering and we knew that, then in that world we might think it's bad that the deer's life was cut short, but we might not empathize with the deer itself. If we knew that when children were mutilated they didn't suffer, we might acknowledge the badness of their lack of function and short life, we might grieve *for* the child, and even *next to* the child, but we might not adequately grieve *with* the child. If we knew that children's lives were sometimes short because of illness but that children never suffered as a result, we might intellectually acknowledge that our time on Earth is a game of biological chance, and we might acknowledge the badness of that situation, but we might not empathetically enter into the child's situation and grieve the child's situation with the child. Empathy is important, and suffering activates it.[31]

Why think that suffering activates empathy? One reason is that we tend to have different emotional reactions to the death of martyrs who steadfastly endured torture with a kind of enjoyment than we do to people who suffer in desperation to live.[32] In these cases, we might look to the martyrs primarily with admiration, but we might primarily feel bad for the non-martyr sufferers, even though the failure to flourish is present in both cases.

We also tend to grieve with grievers. We might feel worse for someone who was betrayed and who continues to suffer as a result than someone who was betrayed but who has moved on quickly. The former person's grieving is a call for to us to acknowledge that person's loss with him or her (even if that person doesn't intend it as such), whereas the latter person doesn't suffer in a way that calls for our empathy.

For another reason, there are some positions according to which a wrongdoer is more pitiable than the person wronged.[33] The reasoning is that the wrongdoer is in a more objectively bad state—it's worse to be a bad person and not be wronged than it is to be a good person who has been wronged. Even if we believe such a view to be true, we are nevertheless inclined to pity the

[31] In fact, if someone denies that our attitudes would be sufficiently different in this hypothetical world, I suspect this denial is the result of importing our current dispositions, which are formed through aligning with others through suffering, into the hypothetical world I've envisioned.
[32] See the paragraph above about martyrdom and its notes.
[33] Socrates holds this position in his *Gorgias*, and is articulated in Guthrie (1975, 91). Stoics, e.g. Marcus Aurelius (175/1983, 4.26) and Seneca (64/2015, Letter 81) maintain this position, and it is reiterated by Donaldson (2018, 63-64). Booker T. Washington (1896) endorses it in his "Democracy and Education" speech. The position follows from any position according to which virtue and vice take priority as good/bad over physical or emotional flourishing/harm.

suffering victim more. Why? Because a victim's suffering calls out to us to feel the badness of the victim's situation with the victim.

Finally, we might all know of a student who seems to struggle emotionally, suffering through the coursework and asking for more attention than other students. Many soft-hearted professors give special attention to these students, even if they aren't as deserving of it, because those professors' hearts acknowledge the empathy that the student's suffering calls out for. This occurs even if, objectively speaking, that student needs less help than do other students, and even if that student needs not to have professors' attention.

Would We Choose to Suffer?

This section's thesis is that we would choose to undergo much of the suffering that we undergo in this life were we to have a holistic view of our lives.[34] From what was said above, when we have such a view,

1) we assume the events that are the occasion for suffering do, in fact, occur in our lives,
2) we have full information about our lives as a whole and the value of our suffering,[35] including the six ways suffering is valuable outlined above, and
3) the choice would be made from a reflective perspective at or after our lives' end.[36]

Why think we'd choose to have suffered, given these assumptions? One reason is that the older we get and the more we reflect on our lives, the more we see our suffering as meaningful, valuable, and even choiceworthy.[37] When wise people reflect on their lives in their old age, they see themselves as having been formed, or forged, through suffering. They don't wish their life to have been smooth, easy, or pleasurable. It's stories of persevering through hardship and suffering

[34] After this paper's acceptance, Blake McAllister shared a manuscript with me of a book he's writing on in which he argues that in hindsight we would accept, embrace, or choose the evils we've encountered if they are redeemed (McAllister, manuscript). The reasons McAllister offers are different from the reasons offered here. Coetsee (2022) gives a consent-based argument, but that argument does not involve hindsight.

[35] This full information requires that we know what the suffering feels like subjectively, as Marilyn McCord Adams highlights. "[T]he value of a person's life may be assessed from the inside (in relation to that person's own goals, ideals, and choices) and from the outside (in relation to the aims, tastes, values, and preferences of others) ... My notion is that for a person's life to be a great good to him/her on the whole, the external point of view (even if it is God's) is not sufficient." (1999, 145)

[36] There are two other assumptions that I've tabled for length. First, I assume our suffering doesn't cause evil to others. In these cases, we might choose not to have suffered, even if our suffering was valuable for us. Second, I assume that our suffering doesn't require that we're prevented from acquiring vast amounts of other valuable things later in life. This would happen if, for example, our suffering requires that we persist in an enduring depression and/or pessimism that prevents appreciation of goods in life. In these cases, these instances of suffering should perhaps be treated in the same way as other evils, and we might thus choose not to experience them.

[37] This applies both for trivial or momentary suffering and for extensive suffering. For trivial or momentary suffering: embarrassment in middle school that at the time we thought was the end of the world, others' slights that dominated our thoughts for a short time, or a physical injury that brought great pain that seemed like it would never end. Extensive suffering: extended hardship in a long-term committed relationship, severe bodily pain over a long period of time, or long-term existential suffering over having a seemingly meaningless job and/or social impact.

that get primary place in their life stories. This is true even if, in old age, we become more tender-hearted and recognize just how bad suffering is. As we get older and wiser, we see upon reflection how suffering is for a purpose or cause, is the fitting response or result to a situation, helps us improve, directs us to depend on God, makes us who we are, and calls out to others to empathize with us. These valuable features of suffering all rely on the fact that we really suffer—that we don't, at the time, enjoy being in the state that would be our suffering. Suffering must really hurt. And later, we might choose to have suffered regardless, or even because, it hurt.

Many of us are reluctant to agree that we would choose to have suffered. We're often of two minds about suffering, where each "mind" views our suffering from a different perspective. On one hand, we might put ourselves into the shoes of the sufferer at the time of suffering and, situated this way, empathetically choose not to suffer. On the other hand, we might take a more distanced perspective on life and see the suffering as worth it, all things considered, for one or more of the reasons outlined above. By switching back and forth between these perspectives, we can be of conflicting minds about the suffering.

Stoic philosophers advocate for the distanced perspective on our lives and thus seeing suffering as valuable. According to Stoics, one should even view suffering as valuable at the time of suffering and thus experience joy and tranquility amidst suffering at the time of suffering. As described above, experiencing this kind of joy and tranquility amidst suffering would not really be to suffer. We can, however, modify the Stoic perspective so that, viewed from this distanced perspective, suffering is valuable but only insofar as one really suffers.

Alternatively, contemporary literature on hedonism and the Problem of Suffering emphasize the badness of suffering itself. In literature on hedonism, since suffering is a kind of pain, and pain is the primary evil, suffering is, *ipso facto*, evil and so should be avoided when possible. In hedonic Utilitarianism, pain and suffering are the very things we should aim to eliminate. The Problem of Suffering literature sometimes begins with stories or descriptions to get us in the shoes of a sufferer to empathize with the sufferer's plight.[38] The focus in that literature is on the badness of suffering, where the question is: what reasons would God have for *allowing* suffering? The focus is not on the value of suffering, where the question is: what reasons would God have for *preventing* our suffering?

The view here is that we should see suffering as bad, and we shouldn't choose to suffer when we're suffering. However, when we take a more distanced perspective on our own lives, we see our suffering to have been valuable, and we would, from that perspective (the holistic perspective,

[38] Much work on the Problem of Suffering, then, begins with a framing effect intended to "steelman" the argument, but it also has the effect of fixating our attention on the badness of pain rather than widening our perspective to appreciate the weight of a wide array goods and evils.

which satisfies 1-3 above), choose to have suffered.[39] This view won't be convincing to someone who's currently suffering or near suffering, but as we become more distanced from our suffering, our judgments about that suffering are different, as described above.

One might object: perhaps from one perspective we would choose to have suffered, but the amount of suffering we actually experience is excessive. We shouldn't have to suffer as much as we do in order for our suffering to be valuable in the above ways.

I have two replies. The first begins by considering how much our suffering would need to be reduced until the objection would no longer apply. One might think our suffering only needs to be reduced a little. But then, in the worlds in which our suffering is less, we'd have a different baseline and different expectations for suffering, and, based on those new expectations, our suffering would also seem too much, and the objection would remain.[40] For the objection not to apply, our suffering would need to be easily manageable. But this fact reveals two problems with the objection.

First, easily manageable suffering wouldn't be valuable in the six ways above. If suffering is easily manageable, suffering wouldn't effectively screen out devotion or commitment to a cause. We can't fittingly respond to grave evils with easily manageable suffering. Easily manageable suffering wouldn't help us improve as much, because there wouldn't be much to overcome, and, if one could overcome the suffering on one's own, one wouldn't need to depend on God for help. Suffering that's manageable is hardly identity-making, and it doesn't activate others' empathy, since others would expect one to be able to manage one's suffering on one's own.

Second, it's unclear whether there could be a state in which our suffering seems to us to be easily manageable. Perhaps our perception of the severity of suffering is, independent of our efforts, adapted to the suffering we're familiar with, such that the upper limits of what we're familiar with are always perceived to be unmanageable. After all, children wail at the slightest scratch or feeling of hunger. We do adapt, though—many adults don't even notice when they're scratched or slightly hungry. Perhaps, then, if there were such thing as an objectively low level of suffering, it would seem to us to be too severe, or, after we've adapted, seem easily manageable. And if that's true, then perhaps any level at which the objective ceiling of suffering is set (if there is such

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[39] Seneca expresses this idea when he advises, quoting Virgil, "When a person is in the midst of difficulties, let him say, 'Perhaps this too will someday bring us pleasure.'" (64/2015, 78.15; Virgil 19 B.C./2008, I.223)
To be clear, the view here is not that we should want to suffer more than we do. Much suffering that's self-inflicted is not suffering that we would choose were we to take a holistic view of our lives. Plus, additional suffering might prevent us from achieving goods that are only achievable without that suffering. The view here does not, however, prevent us from wanting to suffer more than we do. In the cases described in the previous section, one might want to suffer for a cause to demonstrate devotion to the cause, or one might want to have a more fitting response to one's situation, which might require more suffering.

[40] It is the nature of suffering to be set relative to a baseline or expectation, as described by Epicurus (270/1993, 29-31; 300/1994, 28-30) and Hurka (2011, 32-38).

a thing) is just as objectionable as the ceiling at which suffering is set now. If this is true, the objection applies to any level of suffering at or below its current level, so the objection is to any suffering at all, not just the amount. And, as was shown, we would choose to have suffered for the reasons above.

The second reply is that we would expect that during and around the time of suffering, we are likely to be biased against the value of suffering. Just as we might assess the value of an individual person lower when, and to the extent that, the person is causing us pain, so we might assess the value of an experience lower when, and to the extent that, the experience is causing us pain. Just as we might be prone to act in vengeance against an individual who causes us pain even though doing so would be to devalue that individual, so we might be prone to destroy or eliminate an experience that causes us pain even though doing so would be to devalue the experience. We should, then, be skeptical about our ability to make an accurate assessment about the value of suffering until we are sufficiently distanced from it.

To conclude this section, I've argued that we would choose to have suffered if we took a distanced, holistic perspective on our lives, as if we were at or after its end, in which we have full information about our lives as a whole and the value of our suffering. In the next section, I argue that God would allow us to suffer, just as we would chose to allow ourselves to have suffered.

2. Suffering God Would Choose for Us

One premise in the Argument from Suffering against God's existence is that God (if God exists) isn't justified in allowing us to suffer. Instead, God is obligated to remove or alleviate our suffering. God knows about our suffering and has the power to prevent it but doesn't. Many take this to indicate that God would, *per impossibile*, not be all-Good, and since being all-good is necessary for God, God doesn't exist.[41]

Further, even if our suffering is good for us, one might think God shouldn't allow us to suffer. If God doesn't prevent our suffering for the sake of a good that would (or could) result, God thus justifies the means (not preventing our suffering) by the ends (the goods that would come from our suffering). The ends don't justify the means, though, even for God.[42]

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[41] I do not here address the objection that God isn't morally justified in creating a world that is structured such that we suffer for purposes, identity-making, self-improvement, etc. If God has committed a moral wrong for having created a world with such a structure, that is an evil that is not itself suffering, so it is out of the scope of this paper. Here I assume the world has the structure it does and address the Problem of Suffering within such a world.

[42] This is the deontological problem of evil, as originated in Mooney (2017) and articulated well by Bishop (2018, 27): "The really serious problem is that, from the supposed fact that certain sufferings are unavoidable if the sufferers are to attain authentic flourishing, it does not follow that a person with the relevant power would be justified in causing or permitting those sufferings in order to promote the flourishing…[because of] familiar ethical doubts about whether one may cause or permit evil that good may come."

In reply, I argue that God is justified in allowing us to suffer because God is choosing for us what we would have chosen for ourselves were we to take a holistic view of our lives. God is, in fact, in the position of having a holistic view of our lives.[43] God is thus just as well-positioned to make choices for us as we would be were we to make choices for ourselves while viewing our lives holistically. God, by allowing us to suffer, is thereby acting as our proxy, making decisions for us as we would make them for ourselves were we more informed, looking on our lives as if we were at or after our lives' end.

To be sure, when we're genuinely suffering, we might, at that time, choose to have the suffering prevented. This is compatible with the fact that we would, with more information, choose to have suffered. God, by acting as our proxy, would thus be making suffering-allowing decisions as if God were us in the future, with more information, making a decision about our current self. God is respecting the wishes of our wiser, more informed, future self over the wishes of our narrow-minded, pain-focused present self.[44]

Wise proxies make decisions for someone on the basis of what that person would choose for himself or herself, were the person fully informed, rather than what the person might choose at the present time. Wise proxies use their knowledge of a person to choose what the person would have wanted so as to make the wisest decision for the person as the person would have made were that person well-positioned to make such a choice. That is how a wise God would make suffering-allowing decisions for us: God is choosing for us as we would choose for our present selves were we to be well-positioned to make such a choice.

Does God have the moral standing to make this choice for us? To answer, note that in health care contexts, when a patient is unable to make medical decisions, someone who presumably knows the patient best—a relative, by default[45]—is called upon to make health care decisions for the patient as a proxy[46]—to make decisions as if the patient would make those decisions for himself or herself. Similarly, in suffering contexts, someone who presumably knows the sufferer best—God—is called upon to make suffering decisions for the sufferer as if the sufferer would make those decisions for himself or herself.

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[43] This, I take it, an upshot of the omniscience attribute of God, which is an attribute of the tri-omni God of classical theism, and which is assumed in Arguments from Evil. A similar position is also expressed in Coetsee (2022).
[44] To be sure, claims about one's present and future self are meant only to stand in for information one has about one's life. The claim here is *not* that one should have a bias toward one's future self over one's present self just because one is future and the other is present. The claim is that one should have a bias toward wiser versions of oneself. We do not always make choices that align with what we take to be wiser advice, even from our future selves.
[45] This is the rationale for having the patients' relatives make decisions for the patient—it is the patient's relatives who presumably know the patient best, as is commonly mentioned in health care professionals' training on surrogates and proxies. See also Buchanan and Brock (1990, 136).
[46] I am using 'proxy' to refer to any substitute decision maker, chosen or unchosen. Unchosen decision makers are called "surrogates" in current health care discourse.

Of course, in health care contexts, proxies aren't called upon to make decisions for us if we're able to make competent, informed decisions for ourselves at the time. In those cases, we make our own health care decisions. Proxies are only called upon when we're unable to make competent, informed decisions. For some examples, we're considered incompetent if we're inundated with pain and so would make decisions under too much duress,[47] and we're considered uninformed if we're too narrow-minded to make wise choices about our own lives—e.g. we're too focused on the pain to adequately consider other aspects of our lives.[48] Patients can't make their own medical decisions when they're writhing in pain, and when a patient is only focused on the pain and requests a quick death just because of momentary pain, medical professionals rightly do not honor patients' requests at that time.[49]

Similarly, we are, at the time of suffering, unable to make competent, informed decisions for ourselves. In those cases, we're inundated with psychological pain and so would make decisions under too much duress. That isn't the condition under which we'd make wise decisions; we'd be inclined to make decisions rashly, without giving due consideration to the whole of our lives, including the whole picture of our lives and the value of our suffering. Even when we're not inundated with pain, in many cases we're not sufficiently informed because we're too narrow-minded. When we're narrow minded, we're unable to give due consideration or weight to important information that we need to make wise decisions about the course of our lives. We might be in the grip of the view that pain is the only, or most important, evil, without considering the entirely of our lives or the value of suffering as indicated in the previous section. Or perhaps we put too much weight on the disvalue of pain without giving due weight to the value of other goods in our lives.

One might object: "All of this doesn't matter. What matters is that I do not, in fact, give God permission to make decisions in my behalf." According to the argument here, though, it doesn't matter whether we give God permission to make suffering-allowing decisions on our behalf when we are, in fact, unable to make competent, informed decisions on our own about the suffering we'd undergo throughout our lives. Similarly, in health care contexts, proxies are called upon to make decisions for patients when those patients are unable to make competent, informed decisions even if those patients do not give permission to the proxy to make decisions on their

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[47] "Patients are often judged incompetent…when they are overwhelmed by fear or pain, for instance" (Vaughn 2013, 197). Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 133) agree. This aligns with my experience in observing clinical practice.

[48] This is one of the reasons parents make decisions for their children—their children are often shortsighted and cannot understand the full set of values relevant to their decisions. Further, according to Beauchamp and Childress failure to comprehend even *one* central fact is sufficient to indicate that the patient lacks understanding required for informed consent. These central facts can pertain to the nature, probability, or magnitude of the procedure. "As long as [a] patient continues to hold a false belief that is material to her decision, her refusal is not an informed refusal." (Beauchamp and Childress 132-136) Surely, the value of goods besides pain is material to someone's choice about whether to suffer.

[49] Throughout this analogy to health care contexts, I do not intend to put much weight on our current health care practices. I instead intend to appeal to what should be standard practice in health care.

behalf; the patients are simply not in the right kind of state to be able to issue permissions. Further, it makes no difference whether we insist that we are, in fact, able to make competent, informed decisions on our own when we're not able to make them. Many people who aren't able to make competent, informed decisions believe that they are, in fact, able to make them.

Are we unable to make competent, informed suffering-allowing decisions on our own? Evidence that we're unable to make these kinds of decisions is that we're currently suffering intensely, that we give a lot of weight to the disvalue of pain, or do not give much weight to other goods in our lives, as described in the previous section. In fact, given that we've made a decision about whether our suffering should be allowed, the fact that we choose not to undergo the suffering that we've undergone is evidence that we *aren't* able to make competent, informed decisions about our suffering. This is because evidence that we *are* able to make competent, informed decisions about our suffering is that we *would*, in fact, choose to undergo the suffering that we have, in fact, undergone.

If the evidence is inconclusive about whether we're able to make competent, informed decisions about our suffering on our own, there needs to be someone who can, to the greatest extent possible, objectively adjudicate whether we're competent and informed. And if there is a God (as there is assumed to be, for *reductio*, according to the Problem of Suffering), God, who knows us and our situation best, is just the being who's capable of making this adjudication. And if we're unable to make such decisions, God, the being who knows us and our lives best, is the most qualified being to judge who is most qualified to make these decisions for us. And the most qualified being to make decisions for us is, as already indicated, also God. In short, God is in the best position to judge whether we're competent, knows who is most qualified to make positions for us, and knows us so well that God is the most qualified being to make decisions for us on our behalf.

Is it paternalistic for God to act as our proxy and decide for us? Maybe. After all, God is, on some religious traditions, called the "*Pater Sancte*." However, there are reasons to think God isn't being paternalistic. The position here is *not* that God chooses contrary to how we would choose for our good. Instead, God, by allowing our suffering, refrains from intervention rather than intervening, is not forcing us to do anything, and is choosing in line with what we would choose were we neither incapable nor uninformed.

One might further object: "I have evidence for the claim that God is obligated to prevent our suffering: *we're* obligated to prevent suffering of others if we're able to do so, especially if it's easy for us to do so. If we're obligated to do so, then, *a fortiori*, God is also so obligated."

For the first reply, we're not obligated to prevent our own suffering, and according to the argument presented here, God chooses for us what we would have chosen for ourselves. God is not violating any obligations toward us for wisely acting on our behalf, as our proxy. Acting in

this way wouldn't even be wrong for you, if you had the relevant knowledge and moral standing. To demonstrate this, imagine you try to prevent my suffering, and in the process you also encounter my future self, which has traveled into the past to deliver a message to you: "Even though my present self doesn't want this suffering now and would choose for you to prevent it, I, the future version of this person you see here, have come here to tell you that I, in the future, would choose for you to allow this suffering. Please stop what you're doing and just let me suffer." In that case, you aren't violating any obligations by allowing me to suffer. You're instead respecting my future self's choice for my current self. This is what I've argued God is doing by allowing us to suffer.

Second, suppose it is easy for God to prevent suffering. Imagine what it would be like for God to prevent suffering from our lives at whatever time we would choose to have it prevented. In that case, God would be like a helicopter parent, preventing psychological pains along the way, plowing the way for us to make our way through life pleasurably, comfortably, and peaceably. Those lives would miss out on the goods described in Section 1.

Third, sometimes it's not only *permissible* to allow someone's suffering; it's *wise* to allow others suffer because of the value of that suffering. We might justifiedly encourage someone to grieve or to feel guilty for a past wrongdoing. Coaches are encouraged to push their athletes even to the point of suffering. Good parents make their children suffer through waiting. People continue to have hard conversations with their spouses for good reasons, and we shouldn't just dole out tranquilizers to refugees.

Despite the fact that the objection fails, the objection is well-motivated. There are other goods in life that we're better able to procure if we're not currently suffering, so that's a reason to prevent others from suffering. And in many cases, we don't have the required knowledge or moral standing (that God has) to allow the sufferer to continue to suffer when it's easy for us to prevent it. We thus rightfully aim to prevent one another's suffering, even if God is not so obligated, and preventing others' suffering is valuable for us (e.g. we establish connections and display gratitude that might not otherwise occur).

To summarize where we've gotten so far in this section, I've provided a defense against the premise that God isn't morally justified in allowing us to suffer. I've argued that God is justified in allowing us to suffer because God is acting as our proxy. God makes decisions about our lives as we would make them were we to take a holistic view of our own lives. God does, in fact, have a holistic view of our lives. God also knows us better than anyone else and so is in that respect the being who is most qualified to make suffering-allowing decisions for us on our behalf. We're often unable to make competent, informed decisions for ourselves when we're in the grip of pain or are too narrow-minded (because we're pain-focused). Whether we are, in fact, able to make sufficiently competent, informed decisions is to be adjudicated by someone who can make an objective judgment about whether we're in a competent and informed state—and that is God.

God, then, is just the person to make an objective judgment about whether we're in a competent and informed state to make suffering-allowing decisions about our own lives. When we aren't, God, who is the being who knows us best, is the most qualified being to make this choice for us. And God, who has a holistic view of our lives, is in the best position to make a decision for us as we would choose were we ourselves to take a holistic view of our lives. And by making a choice in line with what our future self, with more information, would choose, God is wisely choosing for us, as our proxy.

We would, as argued in Section 1, choose to undergo much of the suffering that we, in fact, undergo. This leaves it open that there's some suffering we would choose not to undergo, even assuming that the events that occasioned that suffering occurred, that we have full information about our lives as a whole and the value of our suffering, and that the choice is made at or after the end of our lives. How much suffering would we choose not to undergo were we to take this holistic view of our lives? And what kinds or instances of suffering would we choose not to undergo?[50]

The answer is: we don't know, and there's no way we can know. In fact, for any kind or amount of suffering we undergo, we have reasons to be skeptical about whether we'd choose *not* to allow it under the conditions 1-3 described at the end of the previous section. So, we should be skeptical about whether *God* wouldn't allow *all* instances of suffering on our behalf. This is for two reasons.

First, there is much suffering that we later would choose to have undergone (were we to have a holistic view of our lives), that we would not, around the time of suffering, choose to undergo. Further, much of the suffering that we would later choose to have undergone is suffering that, around the time of suffering, we couldn't *imagine* we would ever choose to have undergone. Just as our visual evidence that we're reasoning well is undercut by evidence that we've taken a pill that makes us think we're reasoning well when we're not, so our evidence that we would never choose our suffering is undercut by evidence that we've taken something akin to a suffering pill—we're in the grips of a mindset in which we think we'd never choose our suffering when we would, in fact, choose it. Our evidence that we've taken something akin to a suffering pill is that we're currently suffering or are focused on pain as the only, primary, or most weighty evil. Such a state makes it difficult, or sometimes impossible, to think we would ever have chosen our suffering. (We exit this narrow-minded state when the suffering dissipates at the end of our life or, we can imagine, after its end, were we to reflect with more information about our life and the value of suffering, as described above). For any instance of suffering, then, our evidence for the belief about the likelihood of it never being chosen by us is undercut.

[50] Another way to frame this question is: for an instance or kind of suffering that we think isn't valuable enough for any of the reasons outlined in Section 1, under what conditions is that thought true?

Second, we might *never* be in a position to know that we would never choose to have undergone a particular kind or instance of suffering. This is because we don't have clear evidence that we're not under the influence of the "suffering pill," or narrow-minded, pain-focused state, until we believe that we would choose to have suffered. The fact that we believe we would not choose to have undergone a particular kind or instance of suffering on the basis of our current value assessment of that suffering is evidence that we are in the narrow-minded, pain-focused state. So, for any kind or instance of suffering, our evidence that that particular instance or kind of suffering is one that we would not have chosen—so is one that God could not choose to allow as our proxy—is thus undercut, and it is undercut until we would choose to have undergone that suffering.

Conclusion

I've argued that although we don't want to suffer at the time of suffering, there's much suffering that we would choose to undergo were we to have a more holistic view of our lives, a view we would have as if we were at or after the end of our lives, assuming that the events that are the occasion for suffering occur and that we have full information about our lives as a whole and the value of our suffering. Suffering is, I've argued, valuable in many ways, as we learn upon reflection on our lives. Suffering is valuable when it:

1) is for a purpose or a cause, filtering for excellence and devotion,
2) is the fitting response to, or result of, our situation,
3) is essential for self-improvement,
4) directs us to rely on, and develop union with, God,
5) makes us into the people we are, constituting our identity, or
6) calls out to others to empathize with our plight,

This value of suffering makes it so that, were we to take the holistic view of our lives described above, we would choose to have suffered much of the ways we do, in fact, suffer.

I've also argued that God is justified in allowing us to suffer, because God is choosing for us, as our proxy, as we would choose were we to have a holistic view of our lives. God is in just this position. God is also the most qualified person to make an objective judgment as to whether we're in a position to competently and informedly make suffering-allowing decisions for our own lives, and when we aren't, God, by allowing us to suffer, is thereby rightfully acting as our proxy. And if we believe a particular instance or kind of suffering is one that we would never choose—and so believe God would never choose to allow that suffering on our behalf—our evidence for that belief is undercut by virtue of the fact that we are suffering or are weighing the disvalue of pain too highly over the value of other goods. In fact, our belief that we would never choose to have undergone a particular kind or instance of suffering will continue to be undercut until we choose to have suffered, as described above. If this is true, then rather than blaming God for not

preventing our suffering, perhaps we should realize that God is making the same decisions as we would—to allow much of our suffering—and we have reasons to suspend judgment about the rest.

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